

~~SECRET~~

8 MAR 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,  
7 March 1978

## 1. National/Tactical Interface.

a. The Secretary said it was his understanding that we worked it out that both [ ] would go up for the testimony on the national/tactical interface study. I said that I agreed.

b. The Secretary said he had been asked by both the SSCI Subcommittee on Budget and the House Appropriations Committee for a copy of the [ ] study on the national/tactical interface issue. He didn't see how he could not send that study. I said I thought that we did not need to send it because it was an internal document. The Secretary expressed his view that the Committee had asked for this [ ] study; I said I did not believe that was the case. I thought they directed that he and I do a study and that there be an input to it from outsiders or an outside group. Therefore, the [ ] product was an internal component of our study which they had received. The Secretary indicated he would check whether this was in fact the status of the request from the House Appropriations Committee. He further questioned whether there was any difference between refusing to send an internal working document and one that was an outside study group that had been brought in on a given topic. I said I didn't really see a difference.

2. [ ] The Secretary indicated that Defense was preparing a special briefing on how to justify [ ] He felt this would have to encompass not only the national requirements such as SALT, MBFR and

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200280017-3

5X1 [redacted] I said  
that I was pleased this was being done and had been talking to [redacted]  
5X1 [redacted] about it. Further, if there were not an opportunity for  
Dr. Mark to present it to Chairman Hathaway, I would plan to cover  
it in my wrap-up briefing for that Committee but I thought it preferable  
that D/NRO make a full presentation of it if the Committee would take  
the time.

5X1 3. Senator Eagleton has been inquiring of Defense about the  
5X1 connection between [redacted] and AWACS information that may  
have been [redacted]. The Secretary provided me a copy  
of the letter from Walt Slocum to Senator Eagleton which explains  
their knowledge and position on it.

4. PRC(I) Meeting on Intelligence Priorities. The Secretary  
has a number of military priorities that he believes should be added  
to the list. He will have those out very shortly; I encouraged him  
either to let us or for him to circulate them so that everyone would  
have a chance to look at them before the meeting. He indicated he  
would do the latter. He indicated he thought that this meeting  
should lead to some generalized discussion of the impact of these  
priorities on the budget, but not get into a detailed formulation  
of my budget. I concurred. I pointed out it would be all too easy  
to add his additional military priorities into the list and that I  
thought we needed some form of constraint so that we didn't just add  
things but gave some sense of priority. He agreed we should try to  
find some way to do that--that is, to limit the number of priorities  
we could have so that we didn't just add new items in to be accommodating.


5. We went over the new Executive Order and the Attorney General's  
requirement to produce procedures to regulate our collection operations.  
I pointed out our view that it was probably impossible to find the  
manpower and time to correlate all of these submissions as Deanne  
Siemer would like, but that I would revisit this with Tony Lapham.  
Beyond that, he indicates that Defense has its 150-page document of  
procedures ready to forward. I told him I thought we were all for-  
warding our comments piece by piece as required by the Justice deadlines  
and that conferences were already going on with all of the intelligence  
agencies and Justice on these individual pieces. He continued to be  
worried about the divide and conquer problem. I said that if we didn't  
manage to have the DCI coordinate all the intelligence views before  
they went to Justice, at the least we should get Tony and Deanne to  
insure they have identified the areas where different intelligence  
organizations might be at strong variance with each other so that we  
could try to have a resolution of these specific issues outside the  
halls of Justice.

5X1 [redacted]  
Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200280017-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200280017-3



25X1




25X1




25X1

7. I asked both Secretary Brown and Duncan their views on the NID. They both read it daily; neither one had any substantial comments. Secretary Brown said he'd like to see the introductory bold-face paragraphs a little longer. His view is this would better enable him to skip reading the entire article. I pointed out if we made them too long then those whose appetites were whetted and did read the whole article would find themselves having to read that much more twice. In general, Secretary Brown's only comment was that some of the inside articles were a bit long.

8. I delivered the memo from Dr. Bowie to me on  defense interests.

25X1

9. I discussed the budget guidance and the fact that OMB was late in getting theirs to us, and that Brzezinski was still arguing that guidance. I further pointed out that our guidance would be out shortly



Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200280017-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200280017-3

regardless of this and that we wanted very much to insure there were no misunderstandings or hard feelings as the new budget process went through since this would be the first time through from scratch. I urged him to let me know if there were any adverse repercussions as we proceed.

I pointed out that we have obtained the S&I reports to help in the present budget testimony.

[REDACTED]

25X1

11. I raised NIE 4-1. The Secretary was generally aware of the conclusions from our previous go at it last summer.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

[REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003200280017-3

SECRET